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The Rwandan rebels in the eastern DRC are restless. Despite the 2003 peace deal, underlying tensions in the eastern DRC never really went away. Battles occur between the Rwandan-backed rebel force led by Nkunda and his CNDP fighters on one hand, and the DRC armed forces, Hutu rebels and a tribal Mai-Mai militia on the other. A major battle occurred at the end of 2007, when the DRC mobilized 40,000 regular and irregular troops (including the FDLR Hutu rebels and the Mai-Mai) against an Nkunda-led force of 4,000 men. Nkunda’s men defeated the combined DRC forces, despite being outnumbered by a 10-1 ratio. Kinshasa sought a cease-fire and peace deal in early 2008, but as the DRC negotiated only with U.N. forces and pro-Kinshasa rebels — refusing to deal with the CNDP — any hopes for a lasting cease-fire were dashed.
Fighting erupted again in the eastern DRC several weeks ago. Though the DRC government talks of cease-fires, Kinshasa is not going to negotiate with the Rwandan-backed rebels led by Nkunda. Hardliners in Kinshasa do not want to legitimize Rwanda’s land grab in eastern DRC by talking to the Tutsi rebels: They see that as tantamount to ceding that territory to Rwanda and losing out on the minerals necessary not only for the DRC’s economic well-being, but also for ensuring that regional loyalties are claimed by Kinshasa rather than Kigali. Legitimizing Nkunda’s forces in the eastern region would also put Kinshasa on the defensive, by permitting the rebels an uncontested rearguard area to mobilize support. That could enable them to launch a cross-country invasion aimed at Kinshasa — which is precisely how the Kabila regime first came to power.
However, circumstances are not the same as during the First Congo War, which saw Mobutu fall from power. Kabila faces effectively no political opposition. This is partly due to the exile and subsequent arrest by the International Criminal Court of Jean-Pierre Bemba, Kinshasa’s leading opposition figure, who is a former rebel leader and Mobutu protege. Opportunities for growth and thievery are on the upswing, meaning Congolese are buying into the Kabila government in a way they did not buy into Mobutu’s decaying government. This means that the Nkunda-led CNDP will not be able to find much Congolese support for a cross-country invasion; there is no indigenous push to dump the Kabila regime, and the Congolese people do not want to become dependent on the Rwandans and Ugandans. And, as during the Second Congo War, Angola and other allies of Kinshasa would likely forward-deploy troops to Kisangani and Mbuji-Mayi to establish blocking positions against any advance by Nkunda’s Rwandan rebels.
At the same time, there is foreign support in defense of the Kabila government to resist a CNDP invasion. There are 17,000 U.N. peacekeepers dotted about the DRC, including 6,000 in North Kivu and 5,000 in South Kivu. Though not an effective fighting force, the peacekeepers serve essentially as a harassing force and early-warning mechanism that other interested actors are monitoring.
Paramount among neighboring countries is Angola, which has imperatives of its own that require it to defend the Kabila regime. Angola’s core concern in the DRC is to ensure a friendly regime there that will not permit Angolan dissidents, such as the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) opposition party or rebels in the country’s oil-rich Cabinda province, to have a rearguard area in DRC territory where they can recover a military capability and rebel against Luanda’s control at home.
During the Mobutu era, Zaire permitted Angolan and Western actors to use Congolese territory in attempts to defeat the Marxist-oriented Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the ruling party. To keep Kinshasa happy and, more importantly, to ensure the security of its near abroad, Angola accordingly stands ready to intervene should the Rwandans break westward. Luanda was prepared to intervene in the DRC in January, had the conflict spread. Luanda was also ready to deploy troops to Kinshasa in 2006 to defend against any disruptions that could have prevented Joseph Kabila’s election. Overall, Angola maintains 30,000 troops in Cabinda province, an exclave near its border with the DRC, that can be mobilized for deployment to Kinshasa.
In addition to the battle-hardened Angolans, Kinshasa likely could gain renewed support from other allies, including Zimbabwe and Namibia. Awarding additional mining rights would be the price Kinshasa would have to pay for troops from Harare and Windhoek. The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) regime in Zimbabwe, led by President Robert Mugabe, would find the foreign currency generated by mining in the DRC useful for ensuring the loyalty of Zimbabwe’s armed forces and security services.
Recent conflict in the DRC has remained concentrated in North Kivu province, at the eastern extreme of the country. A spread of rebel activity to other geopolitical islands of the DRC, such as Kisangani, Kasai or Katanga, has not occurred. Those regions continue to act fairly autonomously, unilaterally striking mineral deals that Kinshasa tries half-heartedly to contest. The backroom deals that provincial politicians and officials get from mineral concessions certainly mean less money for Kinshasa’s coffers, but turning a blind eye to corruption is the price Kinshasa must pay to keep secession efforts contained.
Overall, the DRC exists as a coherent country only on paper. In the course of its entire existence as an independent entity, it has never really established full control over all its territory. Periods of quiet were temporary, and the underlying problems of an inherently weak central government facing a diverse and massive territory were left unaddressed, only to flare up again.
Kinshasa will permit Kasai, Katanga and Kisangani to be corrupt and autonomous in order to avoid giving them reason to attempt secession. Kinshasa will maintain a hard line on North Kivu and the eastern part of the country, by contrast, to keep that rebellion as contained as possible. Kinshasa also will continue to turn a blind eye to FDLR activities in order to sustain it as a harassing force against Nkunda’s Rwandan rebels. The Rwandan rebels will otherwise be permitted to steal sufficiently from the mineral wealth to keep their focus on North Kivu rather than toward the west. Finally, efforts will be made to keep relations strong with foreign backers, particularly Angola, to ensure Kinshasa’s protection and provide it a means of projecting a modicum of national control thereby maintaining DRC territorial integrity to the greatest extent possible.